Germany shifts rightward: Our experts answer the big questions ...

The firewall is holding—for now. Germany’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) was the clear winner in Sunday’s national election, putting its leader Friedrich Merz in line to be the next chancellor after a hard fall for Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD). The hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) posted a historic second place, with 20 percent of the vote, but Merz has ruled out including AfD in government. The election results, which come against the backdrop of a stagnant economy and worries about European security, will reverberate far beyond Germany. As Merz sets out to form a coalition, we turned to our experts to answer five burning questions.

1. Who are the biggest winners?

The biggest winners are those parties on the political fringes—the AfD on the far right and the Left Party on the far left. Deep frustration with failed migration policies, the gridlock of the former government coalition, and a general sense of economic uncertainty and decline drove an expectedly strong performance from the AfD, placing second at around 20 percent. More unexpected was the surge of the Left Party past the 5 percent threshold to just under 9 percent. Under thinly veiled peace agendas, both parties oppose NATO membership, have strong pro-Russian sympathies, and call support for Ukraine into question. The success of both parties in these elections signal that the fragmentation of Germany’s party landscape is likely here to stay. It is also a call to action for those in the democratic mainstream to finally start focusing on the fundamental economic, social, and foreign policy challenges facing Europe’s largest economy.      

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The biggest winner in Sunday’s election is certainly the AfD. This is a party barely over ten years old that has, until now, sat on the fringes of the German political landscape. A second-place finish for the AfD shows that Germany is roughly where the United States was about ten years ago: coming to terms with a completely new political reality and dealing with forces that many mainstream political players have tried in vain to subdue. At the same time, this is also a big moment for the CDU, which has evolved as a party since the days when it was led by former Chancellor Angela Merkel. The hope is that Merz sees this win as an opportunity to change Germany’s approach to its economy, its defense spending, and its general role as a leader within and beyond Europe.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The biggest winner is the AfD. The party has doubled its vote share compared to the last election and has also successfully pushed the CDU/CSU, once the party of Merkel, much further to the right. It is less than fifteen years old, and it has now beaten several of the country’s oldest parties to become the second-largest German party. Although the “firewall” will likely hold and keep the AfD out of government, the party is undoubtedly a force that is too big to ignore.

But the Left Party should also be lauded as a winner. Just a few months ago, in the regional elections, it appeared to be on the brink of extinction. But it has since made a remarkable comeback as the definitive voice of the urban left.

—Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, host of the Transform Europe Debrief series, and a reporting and journalism fellow with the Jain Family Institute, focusing on decarbonization, the energy transition, and European policy.

The biggest winner is the Left Party, which scored almost 9 percent of the vote. It should thank US President Donald Trump and his billionaire adviser Elon Musk for stirring up hostility toward the United States on the German left.

—Jacob Heilbrunn is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and editor of the National Interest.

It is a remarkable victory for the AfD and a stark contrast to the state of play in Berlin even just a few years ago. Following its electoral successes last year in the European Parliament and the state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, the AfD now has its strongest ever presence in the Bundestag.

The CDU may celebrate today, but pressure will build quickly on Merz to deliver on his party’s new mandate. Voters may soon become reacquainted with the dissatisfaction toward the CDU that led to the party’s ouster after Merkel’s sixteen-year stint in power. If the CDU fails to address voters’ mounting concerns about the economy, cost of living, and migration—and especially if coalition-wrangling drags on in Berlin—then the AfD could make a winning case for voters in the next Bundestag elections, due by 2029 at the latest, that neither the center-left nor the center-right can fix Germany’s problems.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. Who are the biggest losers?

Undoubtedly, Scholz and the SPD, Germany’s oldest party, are the biggest losers of the evening, having secured the worst result for the party in a hundred years. For Scholz himself, this will mark the end of his career in national politics. The party leadership chose not to pull a Biden-Harris move by swapping Scholz out for the most popular German politician, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, at the beginning of the campaign. It will now have to answer for that move and oversee a complicated process of leadership change and party renewal while likely navigating coalition talks and then government responsibility as the CDU/CSU’s junior partner.        

A close runner-up is the former finance minister Christian Lindner and his liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). Having gambled big on the breakup of the unpopular traffic light coalition, the FDP likely won’t make it into the next Bundestag. Lindner underestimated how effective his former coalition partners would be at offloading a great deal of frustration with the government’s infighting onto the FDP. Lindner, who previously brought the FDP back to the Bundestag after it missed the threshold in 2013 and spent four years in the wilderness, won’t be the comeback kid again. He announced the end of his political career on election night.

Germany’s voters will also not get the stability that so many hoped for after the traffic light coalition’s gridlock and infighting. Depending on whether the Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) and perhaps the FDP make it past the 5 percent threshold, the CDU/CSU might need two partners to form a stable governing majority. There is already talk of a black traffic light, or Kenya, coalition—in German party chromatics, an alliance of the CDU/CSU (black), the SPD (red), and the Greens. 

Also among the losers are Musk and US Vice President JD Vance, who waded into German politics to an unprecedented degree to strengthen the AfD. At just over 20 percent, the AfD performed exactly how it polled when the previous government collapsed. If anything, Musk’s and Vance’s meddling fed into countermobilization. 

—Jörn Fleck

It’s a tie for me over the biggest losers—is it the SPD, who suffered the worst results in its entire party history, or is it the FDP, which, at time of writing, seems not to have reached the 5 percent threshold to stay in the Bundestag (again, that is: from 2013 to 2017, the FDP also failed to meet the threshold). The FDP has struggled to unify a strong base and was often blamed for obstructing the previous coalition government. Both the SPD and the FDP are among Germany’s oldest parties, and both will have a tough re-evaluation ahead.

—Carol Schaeffer

The biggest loser is certainly the SPD, whose support dropped 9 percent since Germany’s last election and saw its worst results in decades. Many Germans increasingly viewed Scholz as ineffective, especially during a time of geopolitical upheaval. He was never really able to send a message of strength and unity from the German government, never able to “get things done.” Rather, his governance was slow and bureaucratic and was hindered by weak messaging, causing the German public to view his coalition government with increasing consternation as time went on. That frustration was made clear in Sunday’s election results. 

—Rachel Rizzo

3. What does this outcome mean for Washington?

Under Merz, who is displaying great moral clarity, Trump will discover a more determined Germany that will seek to maximize the prowess of the European Union (EU) against the United States, whenever and wherever the CDU leader deems it necessary. Perhaps he can take comfort in Trump’s social media post hailing the conservatives’ victory, declaring that: “This is a great day for Germany, and for the United States of America under the leadership of a gentleman named Donald J. Trump.”

—Jacob Heilbrunn

A CDU chancellorship may be exactly what Germany needs to snap itself out of its political malaise, but we must wait and see what happens with coalition talks. In terms of how Washington might react, we should expect some loud criticism from Trump and his team toward the Germans for holding the “Brandmauer,” or firewall, and keeping the AfD out of a coalition government. They will say that Germany isn’t respecting the will of the people and will use this to further their own political messaging and claim that Europe is becoming anti-democratic. 

—Rachel Rizzo

Trump and his team should expect a stubbornly pro-European Germany that will not take any perceived US bullying lightly. Merz has already said that the United States’ interference in Germany’s election via Musk and Vance was as “brazen” as that of Moscow. He also had some strong criticism for the White House over Europe’s exclusion from peace talks in Ukraine. Trump and his team should be advised to proceed carefully, though that is not exactly their preferred style.

—Carol Schaeffer

Merz on election night vowed to strengthen Germany’s and Europe’s independence vis-à-vis the United States. That might suit a Trump administration just fine if that means a push to strengthen German defense capabilities and a new energy policy that focuses on transition fuels. Merz also has a personal affinity for the United States, has experience with the US business world, and could perhaps get off to a fresh start with Washington—if the new US administration doesn’t prematurely make this all too difficult for Merz domestically. Here the tariff threats—to which Germany’s sputtering, export-reliant economy is especially vulnerable—are the main focus. A future Chancellor Merz will also be more outspoken on US tariffs and is perhaps less likely to break EU solidarity on a common European response.        

—Jörn Fleck

“This is a great day for Germany,” was the message from Trump on Sunday. Indeed, Washington has reason to welcome the CDU’s victory. For instance, Merz and the CDU’s relatively hawkish stance toward China differs greatly from the caution of Scholz that often frustrated Germany’s allies—illustrated by Germany’s decision in October to vote against EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. If Merz does ramp up Berlin’s rhetoric on China, it would be an important signal that Germany stands together with Washington on the most significant US strategic rival since the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the CDU’s focus on the economy should also be good news for Washington’s economic priorities at home. A staggering 96 percent of German companies surveyed by the 2024 German American Business Outlook plan to invest more in their US operations over the next three years, particularly in the states of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and Texas. With Merz’s pragmatic, pro-business attitude and background in the private sector, his victory in Berlin should be seen by the White House as an opportunity to work out a good deal in both countries’ interests.

—Stuart Jones

4. What does this outcome mean for Brussels?

German election results tend not to be nail-biters. Reliable polls and the proportional system don’t allow for huge surprises. But the fact that two parties came so close to the 5 percent threshold has meant that very different scenarios, including the threat of a blocking minority for extremist parties, have seemed possible. Now it seems likely that both the FDP Liberals and the new, left-wing nationalist BSW have fallen short. This means more seats for the larger parties and, probably, a two-thirds majority for the center-right CDU, the center-left SPD, and the Greens.

Even if the government is formed by the former two only, it is how the three parties agree to use their supermajority to reform the constitutional debt brake that carries the largest implications for how the European Union can take on the challenges it faces. The debt brake won’t be removed, but the CDU, SPD, and Greens should be able to agree on clearer exemptions for defense spending as well as long-overdue investment in German infrastructure. These changes—combined with the new steps to complete the EU’s Single Market that the Draghi and Letta reports have called for—will provide a much-needed boost to growth Europe-wide. No wonder markets are happy.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

If Merz and the CDU/CSU can form a stable government—quickly and ideally with only one partner—this will be an important injection of stability for the EU from its largest member state. Germany has been AWOL as a political and economic leader of the EU, as part of the Franco-German engine, and as a security actor. At a time of tremendous instability, fraying transatlantic links, and fundamental challenges to Europe’s security and economy, Europe simply can no longer afford a Germany missing in action—as both a political heavyweight and an economic engine. Merz, as a committed European, can offer a fresh start if he plays his cards right. Rapprochement with Paris and early and convincing signals toward Warsaw and Nordic-Baltic partners, many of whom share party family links with him, could set a new tone on key initiatives.  

Merz said in his victory speech that the world won’t wait on Germany. It also won’t wait on Europe. And much of what Europe does next will depend on whether Merz can get his own party and people behind some creative solutions. This will be needed to tackle issues including European competitiveness, defense-industrial cooperation, funding both nationally and under a new EU budget, and a potential initiative for joint European debt. That will likely require flexibility on some German orthodoxies. Much will also depend on whether Merz’s party and coalition at home will allow him sufficient flexibility and stability to retake German leadership and initiative at the European level.

—Jörn Fleck

A Merz chancellorship will mean a stronger Brussels and EU. While another three-way coalition is hardly anyone’s preference, it appears the only other option would be a CDU/AfD alliance, which is all but unimaginable. The CDU’s pro-European stance is deep in its party roots and history. Merz is unlikely to turn away from the CDU’s pro-European legacy, partly because he desperately wants to be respected within his own party. Nearly the total opposite of the CDU on foreign policy, the AfD is a fundamentally anti-EU, pro-Russia party. But the AfD’s electoral successes will not be felt too strongly in Brussels, at least for now.

—Carol Schaeffer

The champagne corks should be popping in Brussels, as Merz will set out to strengthen the EU.

—Jacob Heilbrunn

5. What can we expect next in Berlin?

With votes still being tallied on election night, all eyes are on the BSW and the FDP and whether either or both can still reach the 5 percent threshold. If the BSW does, and it looks like it as of late night Sunday, then a two-way coalition in which a strong CDU/CSU senior partner can hope to push through a more ambitious agenda for change is mathematically impossible. Given Merz’s commitment to the firewall against the AfD, that would only leave the option of a so-called Kenya coalition. If the FDP, against all odds at this point, does make it into the next Bundestag, Merz and the Christian Democrats may have the option of a German flag-colored coalition with the SPD and the Liberals. Merz’s calls during the campaign not to waste votes on the FDP may now cost him an important alternative. 

Both would risk a repeat of the infighting and deadlock of the traffic light coalition of the last three years—either with the CDU/CSU’s conservative ideas pitted against two center-left parties in a Kenya coalition, or with the SPD as the center-left odd one out in a German flag coalition with the CDU/CSU and the FDP seeking to pursue more business-friendly policies.    

Merz has vowed to push for quick coalition talks and a rapid conclusion. That might be more easily said than done if his only option are three-way talks with the SPD and the Greens. His own internal challenger, CSU leader and Bavarian State-President Markus Söder, could make cooperation with the Greens impossible. 

Key variables in this complex dynamic are the AfD, the Trump administration, and Merz’s own leadership. The threat of a right-wing extremist AfD could act as a disciplining factor on diverse partners to come to an agreement and govern together. So would the new US administration further calling its commitment to Ukraine and European security into question. Merz’s own leadership and strategies will also be key in making a three-way coalition work. Europe will watch closely.    

—Jörn Fleck

Next up are hopefully swift but likely difficult coalition talks. Merz announced Sunday night that he aims to form a coalition by Easter. That’s still two months away—a long span of time, during which Europe needs a reliable Germany to face numerous security challenges, especially to provide support to Ukraine and navigate an uncertain transatlantic relationship.

The shape of this coalition remains uncertain until all votes are counted and we know whether the next German Bundestag will consist of five, six, or even seven factions. Two parties, the FDP and the newly formed BSW, may fail to cross the 5 percent threshold, and whether one or both of them make it into the Bundestag will significantly impact coalition possibilities.

A so-called “Große Koalition” (Grand Coalition) between the CDU/CSU and SPD—historically named as such because they were traditionally the two strongest parties—would likely fail to secure a majority if either or both of the smaller parties enter the Bundestag. This is especially due to significant losses for the SPD, which finished third, far behind the anti-democratic AfD—a party that Merz has ruled out of coalition talks. It would mark the first time in the history of the Federal Republic that such a coalition lacks a majority.

—Theresa Luetkefend is an assistant director in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program.

If the FDP is not able to meet the 5 percent threshold but the populist BSW does, there is currently only one coalition that can form a government without involving the AfD: the CDU/CSU, the Greens, and the SPD. This three-way coalition will face brutal negotiations and similar weaknesses to the last government, which could further strengthen the AfD. What’s next for Berlin is another potentially gridlocked government that urgently needs to respond to existential demands on its security and economy.

—Carol Schaeffer

Despite its “catastrophic” defeat, the SPD will be the cornerstone of the CDU’s coalition negotiations, and expect Pistorius to become a more prominent figure in Berlin as talks get underway. After the results became clear, Pistorius signaled that the SPD is “negotiation-ready” for building a new government and that he envisions a “leadership role of the party” for himself in this process—a role that Scholz also officially abdicated from.

However, if the BSW reaches the 5 percent of votes necessary to enter the Bundestag, it will complicate the CDU’s options: no longer will a two-party coalition of the CDU and SPD alone pass the 316-seat threshold needed to form a majority in the Bundestag. Merz will therefore look to the Greens as a third party to bring on board in an effort to govern with the “Brandmauer” on the AfD still intact, which will likely be another unruly headache for Berlin.

It is also worth reflecting that this election saw the highest voter turnout in Germany since reunification in 1989, at 83 percent—up from 76.4 percent in 2021. This should add to the pressure that Merz will be under to form a more cohesive government with more effective policies than the outgoing traffic-light coalition.

—Stuart Jones

Further reading

Related Experts: Jörn Fleck, Rachel Rizzo, and Jacob Heilbrunn

Image: Friedrich Merz (CDU, M), party chairman and candidate for chancellor, speaks in the Konrad Adenauer House after the forecast of the Bundestag election results. The early election to the 21st German Bundestag took place on Sunday. Marcus Brandt/dpa via Reuters Connect.